

tritt der 'Schein' gegenüber, und der Schein ist in seinem Ursprung eben durch das mythische Bild bezeichnet, das aus Hesiod stammt. Es bot zugleich die Möglichkeit, Genese und Einheit der beiden Weltmächte zum Ausdruck zu bringen; und indem das mythische Bild gerade dieses zum Ausdruck bringt, ist es weit davon entfernt, bloßer Schmuck und bloße Allegorie zu sein, sondern eine der Aussagen, die den Schlüssel zum Verständnis unseres Denkers enthalten. Man muß es zusammensehen mit der im Grunde auch mythischen Aussage über den Ansatz der Sterblichen, die das Eine getrennt haben. Wir wollen dies hier nicht mehr im einzelnen explizieren. Hier kam es nur darauf an, die Beziehung von Parmenides (B 1) auf das hesiodische Prooimion in ihrem ganzen Umfang und in ihren formalen Bedingungen deutlich werden zu lassen. Es scheint uns aber, daß dieser Vergleich (abgesehen von dem, was sich daraus implizit auch für die parmenideische 'Theogonie' [z. B. B 13] ergibt) auch den Ausgangspunkt der parmenideischen Ontologie in nicht unwesentlichem Maße erhellen kann. Denn was die Musen bei Hesiod künden, das sind ja die  $\acute{\epsilon}\acute{\omicron}\nu\tau\alpha\ \tau\acute{\alpha}\ \tau'$   $\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\sigma\acute{\omicron}\mu\epsilon\nu\alpha\ \pi\rho\acute{\omicron}\ \tau'$   $\acute{\epsilon}\acute{\omicron}\nu\tau\alpha$ , und an diese alte Formel nicht zuletzt hat das Denken des Parmenides angeknüpft.

Freie Universität Berlin

Hans Schwabl

---

## ETYMOLOGICA

---

The naturalistic interpretation of language, especially names common and proper, is as old as the Homeric poems (see *e.g.* *Od.* 19. 562—7) and becomes particularly frequent in the lyric poets and Attic tragedy. Being unsystematic and fanciful, it produced many absurdities, but to designate it 'word-play' instead of 'etymology' is to obscure the vital fact that the early poets believed that names might conceal the character or action or destiny of the bearer (*cf.* Fraenkel on Aesch. *Ag.* 682) and that in interpreting them they were exercising a species of insight not granted to the layman. The early philosophers adopted the practice from the poets and applied it to the investigation of ultimate truth; when Heraclitus supported his metaphysical arguments on such etymologies

as ξὺν νόῳ λέγοντας ἰσχυρίζεσθαι χρῆ τῷ ξυνοῖ πάντων (fr. 114 Diels) he was simply claiming for the philosopher the same kind of insight conceded to the poets. In Pindar especially the practice is so well established that etymologies are regularly introduced by implication, *i.e.* without an assertion that the subject is 'properly' or 'truly' named; in this category are *e.g.* *Ol.* 2. 53—6 Snell (*cf.* G. Norwood, *Pindar*, p. 137), *Ol.* 6. 38, 47, 55 (Norwood p. 252 n. 45), *Nem.* 2. 8 (*cf.* Fennell), *Pyth.* 2. 72—3 (καλός/καλλίας). In Aeschylus, on the other hand, etymologies are more often than not explicit, and for names 'properly' assigned we have ὀρθώνυμος (*Ag.* 699—700), ὀρθῶς (*Sept.* 829), ἀληθῶς (*Suppl.* 314), εὐλόγως (fr. 27. 3 Mette), ἐτητύμως (*Ag.* 682, *Cho.* 948), given by R. Pfeiffer, *Sitzgsb. Bayer. Akad., Phil.-hist. Abt.* 1938. 2. 9 n. 2, ἐτύμως<sup>1</sup>) and probably δοκίμως (δοκίμως πολυπενθῆ in *Pers.* 547 seems to etymologise πολυπενθῆ as = πολλῶν ἀνδρῶν πενθητικόν). In the following notes I am concerned only with ἔτυμος and its reduplicated form ἐτήτυμος (Frisk, *Griech. Etym. Wört.*, pp. 580—1, *s. v.* ἐτεός), since the special use of these words has often been mishandled by editors and lexicographers. In LSJ<sup>9</sup>, for instance, the etymological sense of ἔτυμος is represented as starting with Aristotle and ἔτυμος λόγος in Pind. *Pyth.* 1. 68, which I shall deal with here, is parcelled up with φήμηγ ἔτυμον in Eur. *El.* 818. The etymological sense of ἐτήτυμος seems not to exist; ἐτήτυμος Διὸς κόρα in Aesch. *Cho.* 948—9 is not differentiated from ἐτήτυμος παῖς in Soph. *Tr.* 1064, and πρέσβυς ἐτητυμίη μεμελημένος in Call. *Aet.* 3. fr. 75. 76 (Pf.) appears to instance ἐτητυμία = truth, whereas the old man, Xenomedes of Ceos (*cf.* Pfeiffer on l. 54), was notoriously addicted to etymologies. If this is a true picture of the history of these words, we can but wonder why, as Verrall said, the essentially poetical ἔτυμος was appropriated entirely for etymological terminology in late prose (τὸ ἔτυμον, ἐτυμολογεῖν, ἐτυμολογία). I list here five early passages illustrating this special use.

1) Fourteen Aeschylean instances of ἔτυμος and ἐτήτυμος were collected by Verrall, *Sept.*, App. ii, but his conclusions, contested by Headlam, are in some cases too extravagant to be credible. For more recent literature see K. Strunk, 'Frühe Vokalveränderungen in der griechischen Literatur', *Glott.* xxxviii (1960). 77. n. 3.

- (1) Pind. *Pyth.* 1. 67—70 (beginning of ἀντ. δ'):
   
Ζεῦ τέλει, αἰεὶ δὲ τοιαύταν Ἀμείνα παρ' ὕδωρ
   
αἴσαν ἀστοῖς καὶ βασιλεῦσιν διακρί-
   
νειν ἔτυμον λόγον ἀνθρώπων.
   
σὺν τοι τίν κεν ἀγγητῆρ ἀνήρ,
   
υἱῶ τ' ἐπιτελλόμενος, δᾶμον γεραί-
   
ρων τράποι σύμφωνον ἐς ἡσυχίαν.

In l. 60 Pindar calls upon his muse to join with him in a hymn of praise for Dinomenes, the regent of the new Syracusan foundation, Aetna, to which Hiero the founder has paid honour by having himself proclaimed as an Aetnaean after his victory. The hymn develops in the form of a parallel drawn between the Dorians of the Peloponnese, their political creed and military prowess in occupying Amyclae, and the Dorians of Aetna, who Pindar prays may likewise achieve political unity and so withstand the Carthaginians and Etruscans, already defeated by Hiero off Cumae (71 ff.). The sense correspondence between strophe and antistrophe is precise, and 67—70 are paralleled by 62—5 in the strophe: 'It is the desire of the descendants of Pamphylus and, verily, of the Heraclidae too, who dwell beneath the heights of Ταῦγetus (δχθαις ὑπο Ταῦγέτου ναίοντες), ever to abide (αἰεὶ μένειν) as Dorians in the statutes of Aegimius.' τοιαύταν αἴσαν means, therefore, the maintenance of Dorian political institutions, which is the necessary condition to unity within the city and security from outside foes; Gildersleeve's notion that it refers to θεοδμάτῳ σὺν ἐλευθερίᾳ, predicated of Aetna in 61—2, would leave the Peloponnesian parallel without any point.

The question now arises, what is the subject of διακρίνειν (= 'to mark off', as a piece of ground, *Ol.* 10. 46, or 'to pronounce, determine an issue', *Ol.* 8. 24). Boeckh, followed by Gildersleeve, Farnell and Norwood, p. 103<sup>2</sup>), thought that it was ἔτυμον λόγον; Gildersleeve renders, 'Grant that the judgment of the world may with truth assign such a lot to citizens and kings.' Pindar, however, for all his appreciation of the power of human report, knew very well that it did not presume to mete out human destiny, and to assert that it did, after a solemn invocation of Zeus Teleios, would have been

2) Mommsen also agreed, but suggested δὸς τοῖαν for τοιαύταν on the strength of the scholiast's παράσχου. But for the acc. and infin. of wish cf. *Pyth.* 2. 24.

tantamount to blasphemy. The dispensation of *αἴσα* was the prerogative of Moira or Zeus, and neither needed the *λόγον ἀνθρώπων* as intermediary. Alternatively, to take *διακρίνειν* as imperative in force, with Zeus as the subject (so Schroeder) leaves us with *αἴσαν* and *λόγον* as two strange objects in apposition. *αἴσαν*, then, is the subject (so Hermann, although he missed Pindar's point), and we should render, 'O Zeus the Perfecter, may ever a like portion by the waters of Amenas, for citizens and kings, pronounce men's account to be a true one.' What account is meant? The etymological account of Amenas, *αἰεὶ μένειν*, supplied in advance in the strophe and reasserted by *αἰεὶ* in emphatic position at the beginning of the antistrophe. Unless *ναίοντες* in 64 is also intended to suggest *αἰεὶ/ναίειν* = *Αἴτνα*, which is doubtful, the stream Amenas alone is being etymologised as an omen for the city built on its banks. Pindar's motive is clear: since Amenas or Amenanos, the feeble, was notoriously irregular in flow (*Ov. Met.* 15. 280, Strabo 240), he is at pains to repudiate an etymology which would have augured ill for the new foundation, and to maintain that the etymology which proved the opposite was also the popular one. For further etymological activity over the new foundation see Aesch. *Αἴτναίαι* fr. 27 Mette. If this interpretation is right, it would be tempting to take *σύμφωνον* in the double sense 'harmonious' and 'concordant with the name' (*cf.* Plat. *Crat.* 395e, *καὶ τελευτήσαντι ἐν Ἄιδου ἢ ὑπὲρ τῆς κεφαλῆς τοῦ λίθου ταλαντεία θαυμαστή ὡς σύμφωνος τῷ ὀνόματι, sc. Ταντάλῳ*).

(2) Aesch. *Eum.* 532—4: *ξύμμετρον δ' ἔπος λέγω, | δυσσεβίας μὲν ὕβρις | τέκος ὡς ἐτύμως.*

With Verrall, *Eum.* pp. 94—6 and *Sept.* App. ii. 142—3, I am in general agreement, but his explanation of *ξύμμετρον ἔπος*, 'a maxim (verse) of the same measure', alluding both to metre and to the political moderates, is too far-fetched; so is Thomson's reference to the Pythagorean doctrine of the mean. It means simply 'a word to square with the thought', *ξύμμετρος* being used here as the converse of *σύμφωνος τῷ ὀνόματι*. The etymology is effected by allusion, *ὕβρις*, = *κόρος* (*cf.* *LSJ*<sup>9</sup> *s. v.* *κόρος*), *ἔστιν ὡς ἐτύμως δυσσεβίας τέκος*, = *κόρος, κόρη*, because Aeschylus could count on his audience's familiarity with the *κόρος / κόρος motif* of traditional *γῶμαι*, Theogn. 153, Solon *ῥ.* 9 *Diehl*, Pind. *Ol.* 13. 12, Bacis *ap.* Hdt. 8. 77 (Verrall).

## (3) Ion of Chios fr. 4. 3—4 Diels:

εἴπερ Πυθαγόρης ἐτύμως σοφός, <ὅς> περι πάντων  
ἀνθρώπων γνώμας εἶδε καὶ ἐξέμαθεν.

In l. 3 I adopt the conjecture proposed by F. H. Sandbach, *Proc. Camb. Phil. Soc.* clxxxv. n.s. 5. p. 36, instead of the reading ἐτύμως ὁ σοφός given by Diog. Laert. 1. 119, and follow him in construing ἀνθρώπων, separately from περι πάντων, with γνώμας. Why has Ion seen fit here to illustrate Pythagoras' σοφίη on the after life by appeal to his knowledge of other men's γνώμαι? Perhaps, as Sandbach suggests, he is hinting that Pythagoras drew the views on immortality which he fathered on Orpheus from the Egyptians. But ἐτύμως indicates that the process of thought has been actuated by something more elementary, viz. the etymology of Pythagoras' name. ἐτύμως σοφός directs attention to  $\sqrt{\text{πυθ}}$  and  $\sqrt{\text{αγορα}}$ , and the clause ὅς . . . ἐξέμαθεν provides the proof that Pythagoras was 'wise in accordance with his name'.

(4) Pind. *Ol.* 10. 49—55: καὶ πάγον | Κρόνου προσεφθέγ-  
ξατο· πρόσθε γὰρ | νώνυμος, ἄς Οἰνόμαος ἄρχε, βρέχετο  
πολλᾶ νιφάδι. ταῦτα δ' ἐν πρωτογόνῳ τελεετᾶ | παρέσταν  
μὲν ἄρα Μοῖραι σχεδὸν | ὃ τ' ἐξελέγχων μόνος | ἀλά-  
θειαν ἐτήτυμον | Χρόνος.

The context is the institution of the Olympian Games by Heracles. The traditional name of the Hill of Kronos, being apparently regarded as a slight to Zeus, the vanquisher of Kronos, is reinterpreted here with all the resources available to Pindar. πάγον has already been etymologised correctly with πάξαις in l. 45, and now, with appeals to myth, 'chronology' and the sanction of the Μοῖραι, Κρόνου is outrageously connected with Χρόνος, for 'Time alone can put the genuine truth (*sc.* of a name) to the proof'. For ἐτήτυμον *cf.* Bury on *Nem.* 7. 63 and for ἀλάθειαν in this sense *cf.* *Nem.* 7. 25, *Isth.* 2. 10. Norwood's interpretation, p. 252 n. 43, 'Truth which does indeed repel oblivion (ἀ-λάθ-εια)', looks for the etymology in the wrong place.

(5) Aesch. *Ag.* 160—75: Ζεὺς, ὅστις πότε ἔστιν, εἰ τόδ' αὖ- |  
τῷ φίλον κεκλημένῳ, | τοῦτό νιν προσεννέπω. | οὐκ ἔχω  
προσηκάσαι | πάντ' ἐπισταθμώμενος | πλὴν Διός, εἰ τὸ  
μάταν ἀπὸ φροντίδος ἄχθος | χρῆ δικεῖν ἐτητύμως. —  
οὐδ' ὅστις πάροιθεν ἦν μέγας | παμμάχῳ θράσει βρώων, |



οὐδὲ λέξεται πρὶν ὦν· ὄς δ' ἔπειτ' ἔφυ, τρια- | κτήρος  
 αἴχεται τυχῶν. | Ζῆνα δέ τις προφρόνως ἐπινίκια κλάζων |  
 τεύξεται φρενῶν τὸ πᾶν· =

163 προσεικάσαι *ex* προσηκάσαι *corr.* M: προσηκάσαι  
*scripsi*

166 βαλεῖν *codd.* δικεῖν· βαλεῖν Hesych. *cf.* Verrall, *Sept.*  
 p. 144.

M's original reading *προσηκάσαι*, which I have verified from the facsimile, yields, with the accentuation corrected, *προσηκάσαι* ἄπ. λεγ., 'to put in the scale before'. *σηκός* is basically an enclosure, and the simple *σηκάζειν* means 'to pen', as animals or men (*Il.* 8. 131, *Xen. Hell.* 3. 2. 4) or even *πυροὺς καὶ ἀστάχουας* (*Orph. fr.* 268). Neither word is found in the sense 'scale', but the scale as an enclosure for wares is a natural image (*cf.* *σταθμός*), and *σηκοῦν*, *σήκωμα* (the thing scaled, *i. e.* weight, load) and *ἀντίσηκος*, *ἀντισηκοῦν* (*e. g.* *Aesch. Pers.* 437) prove that this sense existed. Words for 'to scale' are not in common demand, while a word for 'to counter-scale' is; hence the lack of evidence for *σηκός*, *σηκάζειν* and of classical evidence for *σηκοῦν*, and the abundance of classical evidence for *ἀντισηκοῦν* etc. With this reading we establish a uniform metaphor from weighing in the strophe, *προσηκάσαι*, *ἐπισταθμώμενος* and *τὸ μάταν ἄχθος*, to match the wrestling metaphor of the antistrophe.

Fraenkel's note on 681 ff., the Helen etymology, acknowledges the special sense of *ἐτητύμως* there, but although he notes Aeschylus' preoccupation with the god and his name in 160—2 and, oddly, cross-references *ἐτητύμως* 166 with *ἐτητύμως* 682, he finds no etymology here. The chorus' difficulty, stated with *Ζεὺς*, *ὅστις πότ' ἔστιν*, is to find for the god his proper name, *i. e.* the name which conforms with his nature, and since even to invoke the god as *Ζεὺς* prejudices the issue, the name *Ζεὺς* is said to be provisionally accepted (*εἰ . . . . προσεννέπω*). The subject is then divided into two parts; the strophe deals with *Δία*, the antistrophe with *Ζῆνα*. The two solutions are presented in emphatic position at the beginning of the corresponding lines 165 and 174, where the change from trochees to 'mantic' dactyls emphasises that the solution comes only by prophetic insight.

In the strophe the *φροντίς*, which here, as in *Ag.* 912, is the faculty which cares, is conceived as a balance, with the god

set in one scale and a succession of possible names being tried in the other. Διός 165 is *not* the god but the name, which properly understood enables the chorus to discard the others as being a 'futile weight' in the scale, μάταν ἄχθος *sc.* σηκοῦ, a phrase probably suggested to Aeschylus by ἐτώσιον ἄχθος ἀρούρης, *Il.* 18. 104 (*cf.* γῆς ἄλλως ἄχθη, *Plat. Theaet.* 176d). "As I bring all names to the balance, I cannot put in the scale first any save Δία, if it be granted me to throw, δικάειν, in the proper meaning of the word, from my pondering heart those that would be but a futile weight in the scale." What Fraenkel's rendering of βαλεῖν ἐτητύμως, 'to cast in real truth', means I am unsure, but if it means 'to cast thoroughly' or 'successfully' (and he maintains it is the opposite of βαλεῖν μάτην), it presumes an unparalleled sense for ἐτητύμως. If, alternatively, it means 'to cast in the proper sense of the word', it is otiose unless it refers implicitly to δικάειν. Like Verrall, I believe that the etymology should here be explicit and δικάειν restored to the text from the Hesychius lemma. Zeus was the throwing god, and since *Cho.* 949 gives us Δία = ἐτήτυμος Διὸς κόρα, Aeschylus' etymological grouping seems to be Δία, δικάειν, δίκη.

In the antistrophe the chorus eliminates Uranos and Kronos, both dead and gone, from the list of possible contenders, and then realise, with a flash of insight, that Zeus is the living god, Ζῆνα ζῆν. This etymology seems, as Zeller suggested, to be involved in Heraclitus fr. 32 Diels, and perhaps from him *via* Cratylus derives *Plat. Crat.* 396a—b (with a philosophical development): συμβαίνει οὖν ὀρθῶς ὀνομάζεσθαι οὗτος ὁ θεὸς εἶναι, δι' ὃν ζῆν ἀεὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ζῶσιν ὑπάρχει· διείληπται δὲ δίχα, ὥσπερ λέγω, ἐν ὃν τὸ ὄνομα, τῷ "Διὶ" καὶ τῷ "Ζηνί"; *cf.* *Eur. Or.* 1635, Ζηνὸς γὰρ οὖσαν ζῆν νιν (*sc.* Ἑλένην) ἀφθιτον χρεῶν. For τεύξεται in an etymologising context *cf.* τυχόντες καλῶς *Cho.* 951, and ἐν τύχῃ *Ag.* 685.

The University of Sydney  
Australia

J. H. Quincey